The European Union's security and defence policy was invented ten years ago and has been operational for more than five years. During this period the EU has launched over twenty ESDP missions allowing the organisation to be engaged in international crisis management in various ways. The coming years will reveal whether the European Union is able to meet its ambitions.
INTRODUCTION
Most informed observers recognise that the word 'crisis' is over-used when it comes to the European Union. 3 The story of European integration has been most frequently described in terms of a perpetual sense of division, diplomatic wrangling and failure to meet targets and deadlines. Similarly, the perceived failure of the EU to punch its weight in both global and regional geopolitics is often criticised. Both as a 'soft power' and in its approach to harder security issues, the EU is often perceived by others as unstable, weak and ineffective. 4 While it is an undeniable fact that, in little more than fifty years, war between the European Member States themselves has become unthinkable, the Union's record in terms of 'crisis management' abroad, especially in wars waged in its neighbourhood, is indeed mixed at best. The famous and ill-fated declaration of Luxembourg's former minister of foreign affairs Jacques Poos that Yugoslavia's violent implosion in 1991 heralded "the hour of Europe" may have been morally true, it certainly was not politically. Neither the wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia nor the recent conflicts in the EU's neighbourhood (the Caucasus, the Middle East) have posed an existential threat to (parts of) the Union. Is it perhaps for this reason that the Member States have almost always failed the test of unity in the EU's efforts to resolve conflicts on its borders? This paper assesses the Lisbon Treaty's amendments in the field of the Union's foreign, security and defence policy and questions whether they sufficiently equip the European Union with the legal and institutional framework to face the maturity test in crisis management which it is currently facing. To this end, some legal as well as semantic clarifications will be made (section 2) before a critical overview is given of the legal-institutional build-up and conduct of EU missions in the first five years since the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was declared operational (section 3). On the basis of an analysis of the operational shortcomings 5 Measuring the success, failure and effectiveness of policy making and concrete actions targeted at creating stability and security on the European continent and farther afield is fraught with difficulties. It is near to impossible to determine to what extent single efforts and approaches have led to positive or negative results at a more general level. Nevertheless, a number of activities and approaches may be ascribed a positive (or negative) influence on developments that have the potential to undermine the stability and security of a situation. It is on the basis of such general perceptions that general conclusions can be drawn.
formulation of a solid strategy, the translation of that vision into policy, and the implementation thereof by way of the capabilities created (section 4), the amendments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty will be assessed (section 5) with an aim to answer the question whether the new 'Common' Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) will prepare the Union for bigger, more complex and longer term operations in more dangerous theatres around the world (section 6).
SOME PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATIONS: THE LISBON TREATY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The Lisbon Treaty On 18 December 2007 the representatives of the 27 Member States of the European Union signed the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community.
6 The Treaty of Lisbon has seven Articles only. Articles 1 and 2 list all amendments to -respectively -the current Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC); Articles 3-7 contain some final provisions on, inter alia, the duration of the treaty, the ratification procedure and the renumbering of articles. Thus, in contrast to the 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe -that never came into force due to a negative outcome of referenda in France and The Netherlands -the Lisbon Treaty does not intend to replace the current treaties, but rather to amend them. After the entry into force, 7 we will have new, consolidated versions of both the EU Treaty and the EC Treaty (which will be renamed to Treaty on the Function of the European Union -TFEU).
The reason for the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty can be found in its preamble: "to complete the process started by the Treaty of Amsterdam and by the Treaty of Nice with a view to enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and to improving the coherence of its action." The preamble of the Lisbon Treaty thus makes clear that strengthening the Union's role in the world is one of the reasons for its conclusion. Indeed, coherence of the EU's external action is currently seriously hampered by the institutional structure of the Union, in which external competences and procedures in all three pillars (the European Communities, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters) are artificially kept apart. In that respect the dissolution of the pillar structure and the merger of the European Union and the European Community potentially adds to the coherence of the Union's external action.
The Lisbon Treaty not only integrates the European Community 8 into the European Union, but the new Treaty on European Union also explicitly provides that "The Union shall have legal personality" (Art. 7), thus making an end to the academic discussion on the legal status of the Union. 9 That there is still some uneasiness on the part of some Member States, is reflected in Declaration No. 24, attached to the Lisbon Final Act: "The Conference confirms that the fact that the European Union has a legal personality will not in any way authorise the Union to legislate or to act beyond the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties." Like many Declarations, this one also states the obvious. After all, the principle of attributed (or conferred) powers forms a starting point in international institutional law and is even explicitly referred to in the new TEU, this time with no exception for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): "Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States" (Art. 5). 10 Similar careful considerations can be found in Declarations no. 13 and 14, which underline that the new changes "do not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist [...]" and do not "prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of the Member States". It has been argued that, taken together -and apart from their declaratory nature, these Declarations may nevertheless prevent a 'communitarisation' of the Union's foreign, security and defence policy.
11
The new TEU contains all institutional provisions, whereas all policy areas (including the current EU third pillar on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal matters) will be part of the reformed EC Treaty, the new TFEU. It is therefore striking that both the CFSP and the new Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) will remain part of the TEU. Indeed, the current 'second pillar' will be the only policy area that will continue to have a separate status in EU law and even within Title V on the 'General Provisions on the Union's External Action' there is a separate section on 'Special Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy'. It has been argued that 8 The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) will not be part of the new structure and will continue to be a separate international organization. See also Protocol 2 annexed to the Treaties. On the basis of Art. 5 TEU the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity also apply to all Union policy areas, although the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality seems to focus on 'legislative acts' only and these acts cannot be used for CFSP matters. the second pillar de facto remains in place. 12 The reasons for this continued separation could already be found in the mandate for the Lisbon Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), in which Member States could not agree on a transfer of the CFSP provisions from the TEU to the TFEU. 13 From a legal institutional point of view this does not make too much sense. After all, with the end of the separation between Union law and Community law possible fears of a further 'communitarisation' of CFSP are unfounded and even within the new TFEU specific provisions (including the role of the institutions, voting rules and available legal instruments) are laid down for different policy areas.
Semantic clarifications
Another preliminary note relates to the term 'crisis management'. In the international context, the word 'crisis' is widely understood as an acute situation in which armed force is (likely to be) used. The much broader 'conflict' is intended to denote every national or international situation where there is a threat or breach to priority values, interests and goals. The concept of 'conflict prevention' is thus to be understood as the adoption and implementation of measures that aim to impede the escalation of a non-violent dispute into a crisis. 'Crisis management' then refers to the organisation, regulation, procedural frameworks and arrangements to contain a crisis and shape its future course while resolution is sought. 'Conflict resolution' refers to efforts to impose a (partial) settlement in the case of a crisis and consolidate the cessation of violence. Actions meant to address the root causes of crises which have been resolved are dubbed 'post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation measures' or, perhaps again confusingly, 'peace building'. Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty (WEU), was excluded from the Treaty on European Union. The term referred to military cooperation in actions out-of-area.
Reviewing the significant changes that had taken place in the security situation in Europe after the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis, the WEU Council of Ministers, at its 19 June 1992 meeting on the Petersberg (near Bonn), redefined its operational role so as to include the deployment of military units of WEU Member States for 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking' to implement conflict prevention or crisis management measures taken within the framework of the OSCE or the UN. 20 The EU has never acted in the capacity of enforcer of the peace (like NATO in Kosovo in 1999) nor in defence against an armed attack on its territory. While most of the early ESDP operations were fairly successful, largely thanks to the fact that they were usually short-term and limited in both scope and size, they have also revealed shortfalls, bottlenecks as well as broader issues in crisis management. They range from 'growing pains', including the creation of the 'brand' of EU crisis management as well as the planning and drawing up of appropriate mandates for ESDP missions, to more enduring challenges such as coherence among EU policies, institutions and instruments, coordination with other international organisations, notably NATO and the UN, and consistency of 'output'. 43 Lessons learned from these ESDP operations should be taken to heart now that the European Union is facing its 'maturity test' as an international crisis manager.
The next five years: a maturity test
In spite of the growing pains in the development of ESDP, the European Union has made significant strides in deploying crisis management operations. However, the issue of defining success of the ESDP is no longer measured in terms of merely launching missions, ensuring mission output and gathering operational experience. ESDP is past its age of innocence. The bar is set much higher now. Not only is greater intra-and interinstitutional coordination and cross-pillar coherence required by EU law and policy, 44 Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia, Spain and Romania, the Member States that resisted the recognition of independence, it was possible to launch EULEX KOSOVO. While the emergence of EULEX from the ashes of two years of political wrangling over the final status of Kosovo was in itself quite an achievement of diplomatic skill and manoeuvring, the fact that the mission was born in such legal controversy has had a negative impact on its actual deployment and on its achievements so far. Spain decided to refrain from contributing personnel to the mission. 57 Nevertheless, the political and local opposition to EULEX KOSOVO continues to pose operational challenges for the mission, especially in the de facto separated ethnic Serbian northern Mitrovica and when trying to assure the rights of minority groups throughout the territory of Kosovo. 63 On orders from Serbia's government, the Kosovo Serbs, who represent some 5% of the entire population, are refusing to cooperate with Kosovo's government and with EULEX.
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Kosovo is, first of all, a European problem, and the European Union has the primary responsibility and interest to stabilize the region. Regrettably, the EU's inability to agree on a common policy has not only weakened its role at the international level, but it has also become a major obstacle to determined action within Kosovo itself. The five EU Member States that continue to withhold recognition of Kosovo in fact encourage those who refuse to offer EULEX KOSOVO any cooperation and, therefore, are impeding the mission's work. That stance also makes it infinitely more difficult for moderate forces in Serbia to adjust to the new situation in Kosovo. Arguably, only a unified EU position, combined with the knowledge that EU accession for Serbia is unthinkable as long as its conflict with Kosovo has not been fully resolved, may over time lead to a change of attitude on the part of both ordinary Serbs and their government. Both Serbia and Kosovo also need a clear European perspective and unhesitating help to meet the daunting challenges they are facing. At the moment, both are missing. 
EUPOL AFGHANISTAN
In the wider context of the international community's efforts to support Afghanistan in taking responsibility for law and order, the EU has launched a three-year civilian ESDP mission in mid-June 2007. 66 Apart from leveraging its contribution to Afghanistan to boost its visibility and credibility internationally, a key challenge for the Union will be one of coordination and cooperation among Member States and between the EC Delegation (European Commission) and the ESDP mission (Council Secretariat), so as to be able to speak with a single voice. Yet, EU Member States appear to be giving priority to upping their national profile in Afghanistan rather than on promoting collective efforts through their flagship mission. Mirroring former Balkans trouble-shooter Richard Holbrooke's appointment as US envoy for 'AfPak', several EU Member States (including the UK, France, Germany and Sweden) have also nominated their own 'AfPak' envoys in addition to the EU Special Representative for Afghanistan, Ettore Francesco Sequi. 85 The facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel; protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and UN and associated personnel. As such, these activities helped to speed up the establishment of UNAMID in Darfur, but it is highly questionable whether EUFOR had any impact at all on the efforts by the AU (and the UN) into revitalising the political process with a view to finding a lasting solution.
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Given the situation on the ground, the vast area covered and the logistical difficulties, this operation proved a real challenge for the EU. neighbouring Chad and a crisis of even greater dimensions. Arguably, EUFOR's mandate, like that of its successor MINURCAT, was too restricted as it was limited to reducing insecurity in camps for refugees and internally displaced persons and the surrounding areas and did not include, as it needed to, elements to eradicate the root causes of the conflict. 
Challenges for EU Crisis Management in the Coming Years
Introduction
The EU not only faces legal and political challenges in crisis management that forces it to explain its interpretation of public international law and redefine its approach to both unlike-minded countries, as well as powerful allies demanding a bigger input in operations elsewhere, it also has to ensure that internal political and administrative cohesion is maintained and that operational demands posed by big and increasingly hybrid missions in difficult and dangerous situations are met and are translated into successful action. Last but certainly not least, shortcomings in both budget and capabilities will have to be addressed. 100 Needless to say, this is huge test for the European Security and Defence Policy, the outcome of which will define not just the future of European crisis management, but indeed the very position of the European Union on the international political scene.
The internal vs. external and soft vs. hard divides in EU security policies
A theme which emerges from the 'test cases' elaborated above is that the classic distinctions between internal and external security and hard and soft security no longer apply to the analytical framework in which the issues related to these concepts are approached. What we are observing is a merging of the concepts of internal and external security and a shifting emphasis between soft and hard security. The first point, i.e. that the internal and external security concepts are both transboundary in nature, is illustrated by, e.g., the need to fight terrorist groups on the AfghanPakistani border in order to better protect the EU's internal security against terrorist attacks and by the need to monitor the transit of natural gas to secure deliveries to the EU in the wake of the dispute between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009 over the payment of supplies. 101 While it is true that the European integration process has always been a trans-boundary security project, for the first forty years of its existence the EC/EU promoted inter-state security through a system of cross-border networks. External security relations among Member States were turned into 'domestic' EU policies and law. Now, in an era of trans-boundary threats and security challenges, the task of the Union is to defend and boost its security through similar networks beyond the internalexternal divide. But the unhelpful distinction between internal 'securitarisation' of relations between EU Member States and an external Common Foreign and Security Policy, a distinction which originates in the tradition of territorial security and border defence, has been cemented into the EU's pillar structure: the Second Pillar (CFSP) has been set in contrast -politically as well as legally -to the 'internal' security domains of the First Pillar (civil protection, energy, environment, health, etc.) and the Third Pillar (police, border control, etc.). However, the question is to what extent a practical and analytical line between external and internal security can be drawn for an entity set up with the aim to erode borders to enhance inter-state security. On the second point raised at the outset of this section, it is clear that, while a lot of (media) attention is devoted to the (problems involved with the) EU increasingly equipping itself for harder-type security missions in higher-risk theatres around the world, the kind of security challenges which it has to deal with more routinely on the European continent have a softer security character (e.g. illegal immigration, organised crime and the disruption of the flow of energy resources). Increasingly though, the distinction between the 'hard' and the 'soft' security nature of EU policies and operations is shifting and, hence, the choice for their legal basis becomes more difficult. This is most strikingly visible in the European Union's Border Assistance Missions (EUBAM) deployed in the EU's neighbourhood and the Security Sector Reform (SSR) missions elsewhere in the world. Whereas the legal basis for EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine was assigned to the First Pillar, 104 EUBAM Rafah was based on the Second Pillar because of the especially dangerous environment of the Gaza Strip. 105 EUSEC RD CONGO, the Union's first SSR mission was designed to provide advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities responsible for security, while also taking care to promote policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards and the principles of good governance, transparency and respect for the rule of law.
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Consultations between the Council and the Commission on the planning of an integrated mission (including a military, a police and a justice component) failed as no compromise could be reached on how to delineate the line of command that could preserve the respective competences of the institutions. As a result, such an integrated mission was never set up. 107 It was only after a joint assessment mission to the DRC that the Council and the Commission presented a joint paper outlining the EU approach to security sector reform. In the end, the military and police component was entrusted to a Second Pillar The finding that the classic distinctions between internal-external and soft-hard security policies are blurring has consequences for the attempts of the Union at achieving more coherence and consistency in policy-making and law-making in the European security field.
Coherence and consistency; decision-making and leadership
The notion of coherence refers to the level of internal cohesion, i.e. the level of institutional coordination within the EU. As such, the principle carries a procedural obligation for the institutions to cooperate with each other. 109 The principle of consistency carries an obligation of result, namely to ensure that no contradictions exist in the external projection of strategies and policies. Achieving more coherence and consistency in policy-making and law-making in the European security domain is not a new challenge but has been heightened. The recent enlargements with ten states from Central and Eastern Europe, Malta and Cyprus have complicated decision-making on EU security policies. Kosovo is a case in point; the definition of relations with Russia another. Also, the Union's new geographical and geopolitical position has brought relations with third countries, especially those on its borders, into sharper focus and is forcing the EU to define its international role and responsibilities more clearly. Is the current legal framework still conducive to the achievement of consensus on any issue, let alone topics as sensitive as security policies, in an EU numbering 27 Member States (or more)? While the increases in the number of Member States do not seem to really matter in a veto system, as it only takes one state to block a proposal, 110 the chances of disagreement and delay do increase exponentially as the number of participants rise, particularly on issues that touch on sensitive national security concerns. The EU faces the challenge to ensure that enlargement does not further disrupt internal cohesion and adds to, instead of detracts from, its ability to externally project security and stability. Without efficient decision-making and/or clear leadership, efforts to converge security policies may be futile. Leadership is needed to ensure that decisions on, for instance, counter-terrorism or launching ESDP missions are made swiftly and to give clear direction to EU security actions in the operational phase. With increasingly diverse interests and approaches to dealing with security issues, the last waves of enlargement have stretched the sense of solidarity and commonality to the maximum. This is best illustrated in the Area of 111 Yet, leadership and decision-making within the European Union are potentially the hardest issues to resolve, with already extremely sensitive areas further complicated by enlargement. In particular, the rise in the number of small states spells greater opposition to large state dominance.
Leadership is required at three levels: (i) the political drive to crystallise the idea of a security policy; (ii) the institutional responsibility within EU structures; and (iii) the practical administration of EU policy. The lack of leadership at these levels makes it difficult to decide whether a crisis exists, to then determine the scale of the crisis, and to achieve a consensus on the response. This failure was clearly illustrated by the arguments over a military intervention in Iraq. 112 In addition, without leadership, it will be harder to achieve the reforms needed to close the infamous 'capabilities-expectations gap' in the field of EU security policies. However, talk of leadership immediately raises concerns about the emergence of directoires. 113 This form of enhanced cooperation consists of a small number of EU Member States, usually the largest and/or most powerful, constituting the core decision-making body. The primary concern is that such a move will marginalise other/smaller Member States. This brings us back to the issue of unanimity-based decision-making procedures in the largely intergovernmental security policies of the EU, the outcome of which has been made more difficult by the eastern enlargement. The arguments in the European Convention on the Future of Europe and the pre-Lisbon IGC between medium-sized states, such as Poland and Spain, and the largest states, particularly Germany, over the number of weighted votes in the Council and a double-majority voting system exemplify the sensitivities of the issue. This argument also illustrates how wary some of the new Member States are about being dominated by the older and larger Member States. The intergovernmental nature of decision-making does not foster a sense of commonality. Member States may wield (the threat of) their veto whenever they disapprove, when the position taken is contrary to their interests, when external pressure is exerted upon them or when domestic opposition pressurises the government.
However, the bottom line remains that the willingness of the Member States to act together through 'their' Union is often missing. While pragmatism about the fact that only a united EU can tackle most of the security challenges posed by a globalising world should make the Member States mend their ways, it will depend on vision and political leadership whether they will.
Sub-conclusion
Whereas the EU includes the assertion of its own identity on the international scene and the promotion of peace, security and progress in Europe, its neighbourhood, as indeed the world, among its principle mission statements, 116 it has, so far, not excelled in projecting a picture of itself as a strong international security actor. Both as a 'soft power' and in its approach to harder security issues, the EU is often perceived by others as unstable and weak. 117 The EU's image problem has been less related to its scale of efforts than to its inherent structural deficiencies. That is not to say that the efforts developed by the EU could not be strengthened. It goes without saying that, e.g., the extension of unconvincing (prospects of) benefits, the adoption of ineffective targeted sanctions, and the formulation of weak mandates of ESDP missions should be prevented and amended where already in existence. It is a positive sign that, in the framework of the ENP, for instance, the Commission has indicated to stand ready to develop, together with the Council, further proposals in the field of conflict resolution, using both Community and non-Community instruments. 118 However, the real test of the EU's effectiveness will come at the level of cohesion among Member States. A Union that is divided, and where the biggest countries seek their own selfish interests in bilateral deals with powerful neighbouring states, while the smaller Member States stubbornly block common positions and joint actions to draw attention to their concerns, will achieve little but derision, both at home and abroad. A European Union that unites around clearly defined objectives will stand a much better chance of playing a prominent role on the international scene. In the following section we will investigate to what extent the Lisbon Treaty will be able to counter these difficulties. Council, in which, of course, Member States can prevent this possibility. In addition QMV may be used for setting up, financing and administrating a start-up fund to ensure rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of CFSP initiatives (Art. 41, par. 3 new TEU). This start-up fund may be used for crisis management initiatives as well and potentially speeds up the financing process of operations.
EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT AFTER THE LISBON TREATY
The Role of Institutions and Individual Actors
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So far, most proposals in the area of CFSP came from Member States, with a particularly active role of the Presidency. In that respect it is striking that the Member States are not mentioned in the new Art. 22, par. 2, which refers to joint proposals by the HR and the Commission only. However, this seems to be made up by Art. 30, par. 1, which lays down the more general rule that "Any Member State, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, or the High Representative with the Commission's support, may refer any question relating to the common foreign and security policy to the Council and may submit to it initiatives or proposals as appropriate." It is in particular this new role of the Commission that may trigger new possibilities for the EU in its external affairs, including international crisis management. Whereas the Commission so far virtually refrained from making use of its competence to submit proposals on issues in the area of foreign, security or defence policy (Art. 22 TEU), 123 the creation of the competence to submit joint proposals with the HR may enhance its commitment to this area. This is strengthened by the fact that the person holding the position of HR will at the same time be a member (and even a VicePresident) of the Commission (Art. 17, paras. 4 and 5). This combination of the functions of High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission is, without doubt, one of the key innovations of the Lisbon Treaty.
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The potential impact of this combination on the role of the EU in international affairs lies in the fact that there could be a more natural attuning of different external policies. In other words: the weekly (breakfast) meetings between the Commissioner for External Affairs and the HR can be replaced by a breakfast for one. At the same time, the continued separation between CFSP and other Union issues may very well lead to a need for different legal bases for decisions, and hence for the use of distinct CFSP and other Union instruments. This does not only hold true for the outcome of the decision-making process, but also for the process itself, where both the relevant Commission DG and the CFSP section in the Council Secretariat continue to exist. Much will depend on the way in which the legal provisions will be used. Over the past fifteen years, practice revealed a process of 'institutional dynamics' in which a growing together of Community and CFSP decision-making and institutional involvement proved unavoidable. 125 Interestingly enough, the HR may continue its functions even in case all Commission members are forced to resign following a motion of censure from the European Parliament (Art. 17, par. 8 new TEU). With regard to the European Parliament and its influence on the Union's role in the world, its position will not change substantially. Apart from the rule that the High Representative and the other members of the Commission shall be subject as a body to a vote of consent by the European Parliament (Art. 17, par. 7), the task of consulting the European Parliament 'regularly' on CFSP issues moves from the Presidency to the HR (Art. 36 new TEU). This shift is related to the creation of the position of a fixed Presidency of the European Council, which replaces the current system of rotating Presidencies (Art. 15, par. 5 new TEU). One could argue that this is a further step in the ongoing 'Brusselization' that one could witness in relation to CFSP over the past years, in line with the replacement of the Political Committee by the permanent Brussels based Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the increased role of the Council Secretariat.
126 As 'legislative' acts are excluded from the area of CFSP, the formal influence of the European Parliament continues to stand in stark contrast to its competences in other policy areas. Indeed, whereas Article 16 (new) provides that the Council shall, jointly with the European Parliament, exercise legislative and budgetary functions, Art. 24 makes clear that CFSP is subject to "specific rules and procedures" and that the "adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded". This seriously limits the formal role of the EP in the CFSP decision-making process. At the same time it continues the complexity in situations where (perhaps of the basis of a joint proposal by the Commission and the HR) decisions need to cover both CFSP and other Union issues. In those cases, the 'specific rules and procedures' in CFSP would necessarily result in two (or more) separate decisions on the basis of different legal bases, which again complicates the relation with third states and other international organizations.
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Although not termed 'legislative acts' the CFSP instruments are 'decisions', which -despite their 'non-legislative' nature -continue to be binding on the Member States, or as phrased in Art. 28: they "shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity". The familiar labels 'Joint Action' and 'Common Position' will disappear, although all three current forms of CFSP decisions will reappear: the new CFSP 'decisions' may define (i) actions to be undertaken by the Union; (ii) positions to be taken by the Union; (iii) arrangements for the implementation of the decisions referred to in points (i) and (ii) (Art. 25 new TEU). The somewhat unclear -and unnecessary -difference between Joint Actions and Common Positions thus comes to an end, which again adds to a further streamlining of CFSP.
The separation of CFSP is also reflected in the continued exclusion of the European Court of Justice in CFSP matters. However, Art. 24 new TEU provides that this is "with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union." Art. 40, first of all, reflects to the current 'preservation of the acquis communautaire' clause and states that the implementation of CFSP shall not affect the other policy areas of the Union and vice versa. Article 275 TFEU provides the other exception and allows for the Court to review the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons (the famous sanctions against persons and groups on the anti-terrorism lists of the EU).
Most of the institutional changes in the Lisbon Treaty relate to the position of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which will be renamed to High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This name change reflects the fact that it has become clear that the HR indeed represents the Union and not the (collective) Member States. His (or her) competences are clearly laid down in the Union treaty and form part of the institutional framework. Although the term 'Foreign Minister', which was used in the Constitutional Treaty, has been abandoned, the new provisions make clear that the HR will indeed be the prime representative of the Union in international affairs. Even the President of the European Council (note: not the European Union) will exercise its external competences "without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy." (Art. 15, par. 6(d)). The HR is to be appointed by the European Council the absence of consensus among the Member States. The HR is to "conduct" the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy; he shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, and preside over the Foreign Affairs Council (Art. 18 new TEU). In addition, his de facto membership of the European Council is codified in Art. 15 new TEU (although strictly speaking it is stated that the HR only 'takes part in the work' of the European Council). He is to assist the Council and the Commission in ensuring the consistency between the different areas of the Union's external action (Art. 21 new TEU) and together with the Council ensures compliance by the Member States of the CFSP obligations (Art. 24, par. 3 new TEU). All in all, the position of High Representative has been upgraded to allow for a stronger and more independent development and implementation of the Union's foreign, security and defence policy, which -potentially -allows for a more coherent and more effective role for the EU in international affairs.
4.2
New Competences in Defence Policy?
A Collective Defence Obligation?
As we have seen effective crisis management also depends on the potential of the EU to formulate a security and defence policy. The Nice Treaty provided a basis for a European Security and Defence Policy through a modification of Article 17 TEU. Whereas originally the implementation of EU decisions with defence implications was left to the Western European Union (WEU), the Nice Treaty deleted all references to the WEU. From that moment on the Union had been given the competence to operate within the full range of the Petersberg tasks: "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking" (Article 17, paragraph 2). In that respect it is odd that Article 17 still refers to the "progressive framing of a common defence policy" after that same policy has entered into force on the basis of the same article. Provisions like these reveal the fact that, although a final consensus was reached on a European Security and Defence Policy, some member states are more eager to lay everything down in treaty arrangements than others. Nevertheless, one cannot overlook the gradual development from the first provision in the Maastricht Treaty ("the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence"), to the Amsterdam Treaty ("the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence"), and finally to Nice were all references to the WEU were deleted, thereby making the EU itself responsible for the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions which have defence implications. The Lisbon Treaty can certainly be seen as a further step in this development. For the first time a special Title is devoted to the Common Security and Defence Policy (Chapter 2, Section 2 of the new TEU). On the basis of Article 42
The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.
The Petersberg tasks have been extended to, inter alia, include: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.
The references to 'joint disarmament operations', 'military advice and assistance tasks', 'post-conflict stabilisation' and 'the fight against terrorism' in Article 43, paragraph 1 are new and allow the Union to further develop its security and defence policy.
Crisis management may also be needed in relation to an attack on the Union itself. However, with regard to the 'defence' part of CSDP, the Treaty remains ambiguous. The current provision reappears in the new Treaty: "The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides." (Art. 42, par. 2 new TEU). Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty does offer reasons to conclude that something has changed. First of all -and despite the claim that a 'common defence ' is not yet included in CSDP -Article 42, paragraph 7 provides the following:
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.
Taking into account that according to the Helsinki (1999) and Laeken (2001) Declarations "the development of military capabilities does not imply the creation of a European army", it is puzzling what it is the European Council will have to decide on. One may argue that we are not yet dealing with strict obligations for all Member States. This would be confirmed by the second part of paragraph 7 which states that "Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation." While this would indeed allow the 'neutral' states Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, not to participate, the collective defence obligation does not really differ from Article 5 of the NATO Treaty or Article V of the WEU Treaty.
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The feeling that something similar to a collective defence obligation has been created (although somewhat hidden in par. 7 of Art. 42) becomes stronger when the socalled 'solidarity clause' is taken into account. 129 It is somewhat peculiar that this clause is separated from the collective defence clause and is included in the TFEU (Art. 222) rather than together with the ESDP provisions in the TEU. The clause does not restrict common defence to 'armed aggression', but in fact extends the obligation to terrorist attacks:
The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to: (a) -prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; -protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; -assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack; (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.
Paragraph 2 adds the following:
Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council.
Paragraph 3 refers to a coordinating role of the Council as well as the procedure: the arrangements for the implementation of the solidarity clause shall be defined by a decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the HR. The idea that the decision on a mutual defence commitment was deliberately taken is confirmed by the fact that this point was already subject to debate during the Convention on (a) cooperate, as from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a view to achieving approved objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment, and regularly review these objectives, in the light of the security environment and of the Union's international responsibilities; (b) bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, particularly by harmonising the identification of their military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, specialising their defence means and capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation in the fields of training and logistics; (c) take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common objectives regarding the commitment of forces, including possibly reviewing their national decision-making procedures; (d) work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good, including through multinational approaches, and without prejudice to undertakings in this regard within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the shortfalls perceived in the framework of the 'Capability Development Mechanism'; (e) take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency.
Moreover, the 'Headline Goal 2010' includes the establishment of so-called 'battlegroups': "force packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis either as a stand-alone force or as part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases." On decision making, the ambition of the EU is to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the so-called Crisis Management Concept by the Council. On the deployment of forces, the ambition is that the forces start implementing their mission on the ground, no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. In practice this seems to come close to what could be called an 'army', irrespective of the fact that -for political reasons -the documents stressed that the concept would not amount to "the creation of a European army". Interestingly enough this phrase does not return in the Lisbon Treaty.
4.3
The Place of CFSP and ESDP in the new Treaty Structure: Continued Inconsistency in Crisis Management? As we have seen, the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy will remain part of the TEU (and not of the TFEU) and will thus continue to have a separate status in EU law. At the same time the original CFSP tasks will be supplemented by a number of new purposes (below in our italics) which occasionally go beyond CFSP stricto sensu. Article 21 of the new TEU provides:
The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: (a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the On the basis of these principles and objectives, the European Council will identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union, which will relate to both the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external action of the Union (Art. 22 new TEU). However, for parts falling under the CFSP, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will be responsible for proposals for Council decisions, whereas for other areas of external action it will be the Commission. Article 22, paragraph 2 does, however, seem to call for joint proposals, which would force the HR and the Commission to produce a consistent plan, thereby adhering to the demand that "The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies." (Art. 21, par. 3).
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From the outset (the 1992 Maastricht Treaty), consistency problems were the obvious consequence of the choice for a pillar structure in which both the EU and the EC had separate external competences and decision-making procedures. The division between political (CFSP) and other/economic (EC) external relations was never easy to make, but at the same time the Union and the Community were forced to use different instruments and decision-making procedures, thereby challenging the Union's potential as a cohesive force in international relations. There are numerous examples in which the institutional separation between CFSP and EC led to problematic decision-making and 132 Cf. also Art. 30 new TEU, which refers to "the High Representative with the Commission's support". unclear situations for third parties. 133 Apart from the cases concerning the anti-terrorism measures against individuals, 134 the recent ECOWAS judgment again revealed the difficulties in separating foreign and security policy from other external policies. The case provided the first opportunity for the Court of Justice to speak out on a legal base conflict between the first (EC) and second (CFSP) pillars, 135 and to shed some light on the distribution of competence between the EC and the EU qua CFSP. In the event, the Grand Chamber of the Court found, unexpectedly for some and notably for the Advocate General, that by using a CFSP Decision on the EU support to ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) in the fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), the Council had encroached upon the EC competence in the field of development cooperation, thus violating the provisions of Article 47 TEU. 136 The
Court preserved the acquis communautaire in the classic manner and argued that once foreign and security policy elements can be based on the European Community Treaty, they should not be based on CFSP. 137 Even more, the trend towards a more equal position of the CFSP 138 (with its provisional peak in the new Art. 40 after Lisbon; infra) seems to have been halted now that it is being envisaged that parts of the foreign and security policy be based on Community law once the latter allows for it, or be dealt with by the Member States acting individually or collectively. to act qua CFSP may be harmful in areas where they enjoy a shared competence and it may trigger the Commission to come up with additional claims in other borderline areas. ECOWAS may thus prevent the smooth operation of a system of external relations where cooperation is more important and rewarding in terms of output, than competence competition. This judgment, together with the continued separate legal regime for foreign, security and defence policy within the European Union, makes it difficult to improve the Union's consistency in its external actions. Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty introduces a new delimitation provision in Article 40 new TEU, which not only underlines the need for a preservation of the acquis communautaire (as in current Art. 47 TEU), but seems to add that the CFSP competences should also be respected:
"The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter" (CFSP).
Thus, this provision no longer subjects CFSP to any Community competence, but equally calls for all other policies not to affect CFSP. One could argue that this provision places CFSP on an equal footing as other Union policies and at least no longer puts other Union policies in a default setting. At the same time similar internal delimitation problems as the ones we saw in ECOWAS, may continue to hamper effective external action.
Crisis management is not only done by using CFSP/ESDP measures. The classic example of a cross-pillar policy -economic sanctions -returns in Article 215 of the new TFEU. As in the current Article 301 TEC, economic (and financial) sanctions may only be imposed after a CFSP decision to that end has been taken. An innovation can be found in the rule that the final legislation to that end can only be adopted by the Council (acting by a qualified majority) on a joint proposal by the HR and the Commission. The involvement of the HR in this procedure may guarantee an even better combination of political and economic questions. In addition, paragraph 2 makes clear that restrictive measures cannot only be imposed on states but also "against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities." Finally, the debate on the legal protection of individuals and groups on sanctions lists resulted in a new paragraph: "3. The acts referred to in this Article shall include necessary provisions on legal safeguards."
All in all, the Lisbon Treaty seems to offer a number of improvements which may compensate for the choice to separate the foreign, security and defence policy from other external policies (including trade and economic, social and environmental development). In that respect one can point to the broader objectives of the new CFSP and CSDP and the possibilities for the High Representative in his double-hatted function to combine security and military measures with the 'softer' crisis management measures which from part of other Union policies.
CONCLUSION: AN EFFECTIVE ROLE FOR THE EU IN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT?
When we assume that the phrase "improving the coherence of its action" in the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty refers primarily to the Union's role in international affairs, it is indeed this aspect that needs to be assessed. The case studies of some key ESDP missions revealed that the classic distinctions between internal-external and soft-hard security policies are blurring. Yet, the institutional structures do not seem to reflect this fact. The pillar structure introduced an inherent risk of inconsistency by dividing the Union's external relations over two different legal treaty regimes. In that respect the fact that CFSP will still be in another treaty than all other Union policies may be seen as a missed opportunity. Both with regard to the decision-making procedures and the available instruments it will remain difficult to combine CFSP with other Union policies; which means that part of the Union's energy in international relations, including crisis management, will continue to be devoted to internal delimitation questions. 139 After all, as a result of the complete 'communitarisation' of PJCCM, there will be a more uniform decision-making regime in the other parts of the Union: more impetus will be given to qualified majority voting and the application of the co-decision procedure with the European Parliament. Apart from an adaptation of the so-called 'constructive abstention' provision the unanimity principle for decision-making with regard to CFSP/ESDP has been maintained. This means that consensus-building among 27 (or more) Member States should become easier in the field of internal security policies but remain elusive in the field of external security policies. On the other hand, the above analysis reveals that a number of things will change in CFSP and that the Lisbon Treaty can certainly be seen as yet another step in the ongoing integration process in this policy field. The upgraded role of the High Representative is certainly the most innovating aspect. Apart from his extensive role as the key representative of the Union in (all) international affairs, his function has the potential of bridging the currently existing divide between Community and CFSP external relations. The same holds true for the future European External Actions Service, although at this stage it is far from clear what its competences will entail. These 'consolidating' developments are, however, conflicted by the choice to continue to divide the Union's external representation over different institutional actors. It is therefore debatable whether the Lisbon Treaty -if and when it enters into force -will improve both leadership and decision-making in the realm of EU security policies. The introduction of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, while initially controversial, may improve leadership, especially when duly assisted by the European Commission, of which s/he will be one of the Vice-Presidents, and the European External Action Service. Then again, much will depend on the High Representative's rapport with the newly created President of the European Council, who will also be responsible for the external representation of the EU on issues concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The delineation of responsibilities of both personalities is far from clear, at least on the basis of the text of the Lisbon Treaty. In addition, there are two other authorities responsible for representing the Union to the outside world: the rotating Presidency of the Council in configurations other than that of foreign affairs (Articles 16(9) new TEU and 236 TFEU) and the President of the Commission. Future practice will have to show how the new arrangements will work out. This being said, one may sincerely wonder whether the new arrangements will really contribute to enhancing the Union's visibility and to demonstrating greater unity to the outside world. As Kaddous pointed out: "the task of external representation is shared by the High Representative, the President of the European Council and the Commission. Three entities? This comes out to at least three different phone numbers." 140 As we have seen effective crisis management calls for effective leadership and the new provisions do not entail improvements as to consolidate the different views and opinions of the 27 EU Member States. The EU's potential in crisis management not only depends on the general institutional set-up, but also and more particularly to the provisions on a Common Security and Defence Policy. The special section in the new TEU devoted to this policy confirms its grown-up status. The Lisbon Treaty not only extends the possibility of the Union in this area (e.g. by extending the so-called Petersberg tasks), but also introduces something of a collective defence obligation, albeit perhaps in statu nascendi. Together with the European Defence Agency (which is already operational) and the possibility of Permanent Structured Cooperation, the new CSDP may allow the Union to further develop its presence as a military actor. The introduction of Permanent Structured Cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty (on the model of the Battlegroup concept) may allow for a more flexible and -the hope is -a more effective development of CFSP/ESDP in the future. The same applies to the so-called 'Group of the willing' clause, on the basis of which the Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The modifications may prevent urgent EU action to be blocked by a small minority of Member States. But, taking into account the serious problems many of the crisis management missions were facing (related to weak mandates, unwillingness on the side of Member States to work on capabilities as well as differences of opinion on how to respond), it is questionable whether the institutional innovations will be able to improve things considerably. Indeed, so far available legal competences and possibilities can hardly be blamed for the modest role of the EU in international affairs. And -as the history of CFSP shows -not so much the political will of Member States, but rather the Union's own institutional dynamics will trigger the coming of age of the Union's international capacities. In that sense we have to agree with the observation that the Lisbon Treaty "is also very much an enabling document in the sense that it provides for reforms, but with the details for their operationalization to be determined after the treaty is ratified."
